Many international human rights organisations now use the term “genocide” to describe Israel’s conduct in Gaza, but that has had no impact on developments on the ground. A ceasefire remains unlikely. If one is somehow agreed in the coming weeks, it is not expected to last. In Israel, calls for the US to strike Iran will likely intensify. The regime in Tehran has been weakened and seems much less of a threat to Benjamin Netanyahu, let alone the US. Will Donald Trump pull the trigger? He has shown little appetite for such adventures in the past, but he may agree to a limited strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
So far, the most seismic consequences of Israel’s war against Hezbollah have been felt in Syria. As rebels defeated the Syrian army in December, the much-diminished Lebanese militant group had no ability to succour its long-time ally Bashar al-Assad, the murderous dictator who oversaw more than a decade of a bloody civil war. His regime was swiftly overthrown and an interim government has been installed. Yet Netanyahu may come to rue the inadvertent boost he gave to the Syrian revolution. The emergence of popular, democratic governments in the region will make the question of Palestinian statehood more central than it has been in recent decades. Dictators, who only care about their own interests, can be worked with; the Arab public, however, will insist on dignity and freedom for Palestinians. At the same time, a rising Turkey – a key supporter of the Syrian rebels and an influential force shaping the post-Assad regime – will be a more difficult rival for Israel than an isolated Iranian regime. Turkish influence has now reached Israel’s border, for the first time since the country’s founding in 1948.
Much will depend on events in Syria. As Ahmed al-Sharaa, once aligned with terrorist groups and now the interim Syrian leader, visibly shifts to a more pragmatic style of leadership, US and European influence has begun to wane. They have mostly refused to remove the sanctions put in place against the Assad regime. Syria needs investment to rebuild its economy and infrastructure. The EU should be leading the process, which could accelerate the return of Syrian refugees to the country they never wanted to leave. Syrian society is diverse and pluralistic. All the forces needed to bring about a representative regime are in place. What is needed is the acceptance by the relevant global actors that this should be a regime no one in the West or the Gulf should feel entitled to control. Democracy will emerge from inside Syrian society, not outside. It will be a risky process, but we should trust Syrians to find the right balance between different social and political actors.
Reconstruction will take decades, not years, but at last there is a sliver of hope in a region that has been subject to inhumane levels of violence and destruction. But how the new Syria fits with the wider region, and whether in 2025 a new Middle East may also emerge, is still unclear.
This article is part of the series: The year in 2025. You can find the rest here
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This article appears in the 08 Jan 2025 issue of the New Statesman, The Great Power Gap