When Bashar al-Assad captured Aleppo, then Syria’s largest city, in the first phase of the country’s civil war, it followed a four-year siege and horrific urban warfare. Last week, Turkish-backed Syrian rebels retook the city in a matter of days. It’s impossible to say now whether Assad’s regime will collapse on the face of these rapid gains, or whether the war will turn once again into a protracted grind. Even if it does collapse, we have no way of knowing what’s coming next. Either way, however, there will be knock-on geopolitical effects, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the world.
The rebels’ gains fall into the category of shocking, but not surprising. To wrest back control of most of Syria’s major cities, Assad relied on outside help, from Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. Iran has to deal with its conflict with Israel, which has also severely weakened Hezbollah, its proxy. Russia is, of course, busy with Ukraine, where its troops are on the offensive and its air force is attacking the country’s energy infrastructure. That is also stretching its resources. How the conflict evolves, and the kinds of repercussions it has, will depend on how all of these actors decide their priorities. Iran will face a choice between putting more effort into rebuilding Hezbollah in Lebanon and supporting Assad in Syria. Similarly, resources Russia commits to Syria will be those that could otherwise be used in Ukraine.
If both sides decide that Assad needs saving, and is worth saving, it could bode well for Lebanon’s ceasefire holding, and a ceasefire in Ukraine coming off. Russia has, at least, begun airstrikes again on Aleppo and Idlib. But it’s hard to say whether these are intended to reverse the rebels’ gains, or slow them down to give Russia a chance to move personnel and equipment out of the path of their advance. We already saw the rebels capture an advanced Pantsir anti-aircraft system during their assault on Aleppo. This will be the kind of outcome Russia will want to limit at all costs.
This potential new phase in the war could also draw Turkey and Russia more directly in conflict with each other. The relative calm in Syria before was partly a result of diplomatic engagement between the two countries after a few close calls. It seems, however, that Turkey is no longer interested. The rebels’ stated reason for the offensive was in response to ceasefire violations by pro-Assad forces. But the operation’s scope clearly goes beyond this now.
A ceasefire in Ukraine would be more welcome news for European politicians. But the civil war reigniting would frustrate efforts to return Syrian refugees to the country. Before this latest phase of the war, there was an Italy-led push to normalise ties with Assad’s regime so this could happen. This move was at least partly premised on Assad’s control being a fait accompli. Now that this is no longer the case, it is very hard to see these diplomatic efforts coming off anytime soon. Not to mention attempts to declare parts of Syria a safe country if the fighting is reigniting.
What’s happening in Syria also shows how seemingly isolated geopolitical events actually end up being connected, and working in tandem with each other. The offensive is a knock-on effect of other wars, both in the region and in Europe. There will be others. It also suggests, once again, a dynamic where the world is forming into two blocs. One, centred around Russia, China, and Iran, seems quite cohesive. The other, less so.
[See also: Could Trump secure a peace deal with Iran?]
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