Israel claims to have killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader for over three decades, in a strike on his Beirut HQ on Friday. The strike reportedly also targeted much of his leadership group, including Ali Karki, the commander of the southern front and Abbas Nilforoushan, the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. This follows the loss of many other senior figures since the “pager attacks” of 17 September. The day before the strike against Nasrallah, Muhammad Hussein Srur, commander of Hezbollah’s drone forces was also killed. The strike against Nasrallah came as Benjamin Netanyahu was concluding his belligerent speech to the UN General Assembly, in which he claimed that Israel was “winning” this war. Hezbollah initially denied Nasrallah’s death but this was followed by silence.
This is quite different from past assassinations. This is full decapitation. Over the past ten days Nasrallah had already watched Israel take out a huge chunk of his chain of command. Without him Hezbollah is leaderless and left on the defensive, thus unable to respond effectively to a series of damaging attacks. Saturday morning has seen further strikes against buildings in the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut – normally described as a Hezbollah stronghold and claimed by Israel to be used to store anti-ship missiles – as well as strikes in southern Lebanon against rocket launchers and other Hezbollah positions. A leaderless Hezbollah is being disabled and disarmed, while resupply from Iran is being rendered more difficult. A bridge between Syria and Lebanon has been destroyed. Speculation about a land invasion has subsided. Preparations have been made but there are no signs that one is imminent and there have been suggestions in Israel that the success of the air strikes renders one unnecessary. It would prefer to avoid another protracted occupation if possible.
All this still raises the question of how this will end. Although the call for a 21-day ceasefire, issued by a combination of ten Western and Arab nations, had reportedly been agreed with Israel before it was issued, Israeli foreign minister Israel Katz rejected it almost immediately. Prime Minister Netanyahu then modified the position, insisting that negotiations were continuing, along with the fighting. This is a standard Israeli approach to ceasefires, even with those it knows it will have to accept at some point. No mention was made of a ceasefire in his UN speech.
The value of a three-week ceasefire is that it would allow for humanitarian relief to reach Lebanese who have fled their homes, enable foreign nationals who wish to leave to do so safely, and provide an opportunity for diplomatic efforts to agree a long-term truce and military disengagement, possibly along the lines of UN Resolution 1701. If fighting did resume after 21 days, there could be no guarantee of the sort of stability that would allow people on both sides of the border to return to their homes. Israel also has little confidence, on the basis of past experience, that Hezbollah will not simply return to the border areas, regardless of the Lebanese army or UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force, which has been there since 1978.
The Lebanese government is desperate for a ceasefire as it struggles to cope with the massive humanitarian consequences of the fighting, with a strain on health services and food supplies, and internally displaced people living on the streets. But Nasrallah showed no interest. As I have previously pointed out, the issue is the “Unity of the Arenas”, so a ceasefire would mean abandoning Hamas. Hezbollah has continued to fire rockets into Israel, albeit not on the scale that was once feared. It even managed to fire a missile at Tel Aviv, which was shot down by Israel defences. Hezbollah’s threat always lay in the quantity as well as the quality of its missiles, so that Israel’s defences might be overwhelmed. In that respect it no longer seems so menacing.
In its Thursday night strikes, Hezbollah was joined by missiles sent by the Houthis in Yemen (the third time it has attempted to do this) as well as by Shi’ite militias in Iraq who sent rockets towards the Golan Heights. None reached their targets, but they did indicate that the policy of collective commitment remained in place. There were two notable absentees however. Hamas was unable to join in, though in a statement it made clear that it was opposed to a ceasefire in the north (as it is in Gaza unless Israel withdraws completely).
Neither did Iran join in. Its leadership appears to be struggling to work out what its next steps should be, given the beleaguered state of its two proxies. Hamas has managed to survive, but is a shadow of its former self, and its leader, Yahya Sinwar, has not been seen for some time. Now Tehran is watching its most prized proxy being taken down. It has avoided promising to join in, expressing confidence that Hezbollah could defend itself with “its own capabilities”, which can no longer be taken for granted. One problem of course is that in the event of a large confrontation with Israel it was relying on Hezbollah and Hamas to provide the main punch. That is what proxies are for. In their absence, the only option left would be that of launching missiles at Israel, but that did not work well last time. And even if it did work Israel’s retaliation would be severe. Hence its dilemma.
Lebanon has a barely functioning state, huge debts and a worthless currency. It is already coping with refugees from the Syrian civil war as well as now from its own border areas with Israel. Many in the country blame Hezbollah for its current woes. If Hezbollah (and Iran) want an excuse to agree to a short-term ceasefire, and even an enduring one, the condition of Lebanon would provide one. But who will actually now decide on behalf of Hezbollah? Who will negotiate the details of any disengagement? Israel could make a deal with Lebanon and see how Hezbollah responds. Or perhaps it could simply say it has done enough, call a unilateral ceasefire, and dare Hezbollah to continue the fight.
What started as limited action to support Hamas has now turned into a war of survival for Hezbollah. While the roots of its support remain firm in Lebanon’s Shi’ite community, it has been diminished by entering into a fight that it has lost. Nasrallah made a series of strategic misjudgements, including overestimating the extent to which international outrage over the humanitarian consequences of Israeli actions in Gaza would lead the Israeli government to back down. If it had gone in with full force after the Hamas attacks on 7 October then Israel would have found it much harder to cope with a two-front war. Alternatively it could have held fire. As it was, it got stuck in the middle. It did not do enough to cause Israel real difficulty, yet gave it the rationale and the time to prepare once it had dealt with Hamas. Israel has now grievously weakened Hezbollah, humiliated Iran, and as a consequence might have left Hamas even more isolated. But taking advantage of the moment will require knowing when to stop hammering targets inside Lebanon – along with some deft diplomacy. There is still no credible plan for the future of Gaza. Israel has long lacked a political strategy to go with its military strategy. This would be a good time to develop one.
Lawrence Freedman is a regular contributor to the New Statesman. This piece originally ran on his Substack “Comment is Freed”.
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