Ukraine’s invasion of Russia provides a salutary lesson for pundits, including me. However diligent we are in trying to follow events, and however good we may be in explaining what has already happened and drawing conclusions for the future, our appreciation of a developing situation is unavoidably circumscribed. We tend to respond to disruptive moves – such as the invasion – in ways that reflect our established views.
Those convinced that Ukraine can turn the tide of war see the attack on Kursk as an exciting indication that at last this may be happening; those who believe that Russia is bound to prevail insist that this is a monumental blunder that will hasten Ukraine’s inevitable defeat. The positive can note the boost to Ukrainian morale and compare favourably the amount of Russian territory acquired by Ukraine in a matter of days with the amount of Ukrainian territory captured by Russia at huge cost over months. The negative warn about the vulnerability of the soldiers now in exposed positions in Kursk while those defending tenuous positions in Donetsk are denied desperately needed reinforcements.
After two and a half years of war we should all be wary by now of coming to quick judgements. This is not because we dare not comment until this operation has run its course. There are still things that are worth noting about what has already happened. It is more the need to respect the dialectics of war, the duel between two opposing sides, so that ends shift according to available means. In long-standing and intense conflicts, such as that between Russia and Ukraine, particular moves are rarely decisive.
Whatever the immediate objectives, this offensive works for Ukraine if it shifts the dynamic of the war in its favour. Rather than offer predictions the task for now is to set out the ways in which this might happen and how it might be thwarted.
What was the problem the Ukrainian leadership hoped to solve or at least ease by this move? After last year’s Ukrainian offensive petered out, Russia seized the military initiative. Although, for the effort expended and levels of casualties, Russia’s achievements have been limited, there was little confidence that should Ukraine get another chance to mount its own offensive it would do much better. The war to date has shown how both sides find it difficult to get through well-defended positions. So long as Ukraine was outgunned and outmanned, and unable to manage complex land operations on scale, then it was hard to see how they could liberate more occupied territory.
Another cause of this negativity was the loss of confidence in the ability of Kyiv to make sensible strategic decisions. Last year’s offensive involved elementary mistakes, keeping forces divided and signalling in advance where and how they would move against areas of enemy strength in Zaporizhzhia. Too much hope was placed in brand new armoured vehicles and freshly trained troops and not enough respect shown to Russia’s well-constructed defensive lines.
Without a successful offensive no quick route to a Ukrainian victory could be identified. But the country seemed unprepared for a long haul, certainly not when compared with Russia’s capacity to supply men to the front, and an economy on a war footing. During the early months of 2024 Ukraine’s mobilisation bill was stuck in parliamentary wrangling while the next tranche of American assistance was stuck in Congressional wrangling. Internationally the prospect of a prolonged deadlock dented support for the Ukrainian cause. In the US, the logjam was only broken when the Republican Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, realised that if he held up the supplemental bill much longer in the House of Representatives his legacy might not be prolonged deadlock but a Russian victory.
For all of 2024 Ukrainian forces have been stuck on the defensive, struggling to hold back constant Russian assaults on their positions, obliged to concede ground even as they imposed enormous costs on the invaders. Meanwhile Ukrainian infrastructure was getting battered, leading to regular blackouts, while hits on residential areas caused a steady stream of casualties. Ukraine could point to real achievements – innovations in drone warfare, targeting the Black Sea Fleet, Russian assets in Crimea, and oil refineries. There was still a plausible strategy involving hurting Russia and denying it more gains, hoping that eventually the Kremlin would recognise Ukraine’s resilience and determination and seek a negotiated conclusion on terms other than Kyiv’s total capitulation. But there was no obvious way to force Russia to back down.
The consensus view was that Ukraine should not attempt a new offensive until it had mobilised and trained more men, replenished its ammunition stocks, and inflicted yet more attrition on Russian forces. While Moscow might always be able to find supplies of people their stocks of armoured vehicles and ammunition pieces were dwindling so 2025 would be the better option. Until then attrition was the best strategy. This is what I wrote in May:
“For want of better alternatives, a different Ukrainian strategy has had to be adopted to last year’s. The previous strategy was focused on land offensives to take territory and ended in disappointment. Trying the same thing again could well be disastrous until manpower shortages are eased and new troops have had proper training.”
This required patience. Gradually the balance of power could shift in Ukraine’s favour and then there would be a chance to seize back the initiative. Yet that still required resisting Russia’s offensive. As the Russians continued to edge forward into Donetsk over the summer, many urged Ukraine to bow to the inevitable and accept that it would never be able to regain what had already been lost in the face of Russia’s overwhelming might. Better to end the bloodshed and prepare concessions for a negotiated settlement. If, as seemed very likely until a month ago, Donald Trump returned to the White House, the threat of a loss of American support might leave Kyiv with little choice but to go along with Trump’s very own peace plan.
The prevailing narrative therefore was bleak. The story was one of Ukraine caught up in a relentless, remorseless conflict with a more powerful neighbour that was unlikely to pull back until it was offered major concessions. This narrative depressed both Ukrainian morale and international support. This was the problem Ukraine needed to solve, to shift the narrative to a more positive story, one that showed that the Ukrainian army could still take effective initiatives.
There have been incursions into Russian territory but these have been mounted by Ukrainian-sponsored rebel groups (Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion) and were largely raids, perhaps gaining some intelligence on Russian defences but largely for show. If the intention was to seize and hold territory then a substantial force was required and there could be no pretending that this was a rebel Russian initiative.
On 10 May 2024 Russian forces launched an unexpected offensive from Belgorod into Kharkiv oblast. This seemed to confirm the general proposition that it was difficult to achieve any breakthrough on land, even with a modicum of surprise. Despite Putin’s claim that the aim was to establish a buffer zone well into Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainians managed to push the attacking force back to the border. Yet this action still demonstrated that the border could be crossed and defenders caught unawares. Something more than a raid that could yield significant gains if a spot could be found that was lightly defended, from where it would be possible to penetrate rapidly and deeply into Russian territory. A number of possible entry points were looked at before deciding on Kharkiv.
Any move into Russia required surprise. How was this achieved?
The plan was largely hatched by commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky, in consultation with President Volodymyr Zelensky. But the secret was tightly held even amongst Ukraine’s elite. According to the Economist, Syrsky: “kept his plans under wraps, sharing them only with a tight group of generals and security officials. He spoke to the president on a one-on-one basis, without his staff. The army’s intelligence did much of the reconnaissance, rather than leaving it to HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, which was included only at a late stage.”
Also, the US was not consulted because Ukraine did not want to be told it must not go ahead. This betrays Kyiv’s frustration with the Biden administration’s persistent anxieties about provoking Moscow. There would also have been concerns about leaks from anonymous officials to the New York Times or Washington Post.
Senior commanders were given little notice of what was planned and the key units were pulled together only a few days before the operation. Orders were given as late as possible.
A cover story was developed about Ukraine fearing a Russian move into Sumy oblast. If the Russians noticed a reserve force being assembled they could assume it was for defensive purposes, to block such a move.
To achieve stealth, drones provided the equivalent of air cover while Ukrainian surveillance and communications would be blocked by heavy jamming. Summer foliage was used to hide the movement of forces into the border area as much as possible.
As the operation got under way there would be no claims and boasts but continuing and complete silence.
Even then Kyiv could not be sure that the Russians would not realise that something big was being prepared. Surprise was helped by a complacent enemy. Although Russian intelligence picked up evidence of greater Ukrainian activity in the border region and passed this up the command chain, once it reached General Valery Gerasimov the possibility that something big was being planned was dismissed.
One reason for this may have been confidence that the Russian offensive in Donetsk was close to a breakthrough in the direction of Pokrovsky. From a Russian, and indeed arguably also from a Ukrainian, perspective this was an odd time for Kyiv to authorise a major operation away from an intense and ongoing battle. If the effort failed then the Ukrainian’s position would be far worse because they would have used up precious reserves on a futile adventure when there was still vital defensive work to be done. The extent of the gamble may have helped with surprise. The timing made such an operation unlikely because it was so high-risk.
The initial incursion on 6 August involved a strike force of some 2,000 men, including the elite 80th and the 82nd Air Assault Brigades. Troops moved forward in American Stryker and German Marder armoured fighting vehicles. The attack went according to plan. A gap was found in the Russian defences. Once the minefields were navigated Russian defenders were engaged. Units moved quickly before the Russians fully appreciated what was going on. Once the breakthrough was achieved more units pushed into Russia, reaching numbers over 10,000, with their own artillery pieces. Because of Russia’s mini-Kharkiv offensive, the Biden administration had reluctantly agreed that US HIMARS could be used against targets on Russian soil for defensive purposes. One advantage of not telling the Americans what they were up to was that they could interpret the offensives as fitting within the new guidelines for HIMARS without having to argue the point with Washington.
One might have expected the Ukrainian forces to be vulnerable to Russian air strikes. Yet so far there have been relatively few. The Russians have lost a couple of attack helicopters and a Su-34 jet. In one video doing the rounds Russian helicopter gunships are shown blowing up a column of trucks – soon revealed to be Russian. Russian artillery has also so far been less than intensive than in other sectors, possibly because there were insufficient drones to identify targets.
Here are some observations from Kyiv Post journalist Stefan Korshak, based on conversations with those engaged in the operation, making comparisons with the 2023 offensive. He describes an army learning from its mistakes. The Ukrainians got special forces units into the Russian rear area before the main incursion. They were able to ambush Russian reinforcements. During the first days, between 50-100 Russian reconnaissance drones were taken out either by jamming or by crashing FPV drones into them, leaving the Russians operationally blinded.
More than a week later, judging by the frantic driving about and blame gaming and limp fire support I am seeing, it looks very much like the Russian army still has a very poor picture of where the Ukrainians are and what they’re doing.
Ukrainian combat engineers overcame Russian trenches, bunkers, minefields and so forth. Then standard tactics were employed effectively. As a result, for the first time, Ukrainian forces broke the morale of company-sized Russian combat units leading to large numbers of troops surrendering.
“They found isolated Russian formations, pushed combat units around them to surround them, cut communications, seeded news cycles with reports calculated to jam up roads rearward with civilians refugees, picked on units that didn’t have the stuff to shoot back and flattened their positions with artillery, killed off leaders where possible, and then approached those isolated units and asked them if they really thought fighting on made sense.”
Here is a former Russian commander, who had participated in the full-scale invasion but refused to continue fighting, largely confirming this account. He reports that the conscripts surrendered because they did not know how to fight and lacked the necessary weapons, adding that “the defensive positions weren’t prepared because the allocated money was clearly stolen. There were no obstacles — just drive forward.” Russian operational security was poor. The media filmed reinforcements to demonstrate that the situation was being brought under control. The result was that a convoy of the 44th Corps of the Leningrad Military District near Ryisk was obliterated in a HIMARS strike.
And the very fact that they drove in a convoy! At least on the front line, after some time and huge losses, they figured out that driving in a convoy is suicide. But those sitting here still drive in convoys and think they’re going to a parade. The AFU has drones, has rockets — what kind of f***ing idiot would lead a convoy in this case, and one that’s even being filmed for the news. That’s why the guys died, without even getting there.”
At first most information about what was going on came from Russian military bloggers. All that was known was that Ukrainian forces were in the Kursk region and some equipment had been lost during the incursion. This shaped many early reactions in the analytical community, including in Ukraine. The concern was that this was largely a raid, an in-and-out operation, that might irritate Russia but not change anything fundamental. Given the urgent need to reinforce positions in Donetsk it was taken as evidence of misplaced priorities, more performative than substantive. As a public relations exercise it might bring a bit of relief, but any feel-good factor could only be fleeting.
Three factors changed the perception of these events. The first was that this was clearly not a raid but a proper invasion involving thousands rather than hundreds of men. The aim was not hit-and-run but to take territory and face Russia with a new operational challenge. Second, it was well planned and implemented. The mistakes of 2023 were not being repeated. Third, it was successful and has continued to progress. By 20 August Ukrainian forces had advanced 28-35 kilometres into Kursk and taken control of over 1100 square kilometres including 93 settlements. The border town of Sudzha is under firm Ukrainian control. Over 121,000 civilians have been evacuated from the Kursk region.
As it was established that this was a serious enterprise the issue became one of Ukrainian objectives, in addition to boosting the “exchange fund” of prisoners, which would help get Ukrainian POWS released, and national morale. Politically there was an obvious asymmetry: Russia sought to conquer Ukraine but Ukraine did not seek to conquer Russia. Any territory taken and held could only be for later bargaining purposes. Zelensky described it as a blow for peace, a means of persuading Putin to back away from his maximum demands. This, he has also said, requires that Ukrainian forces hold on to some of the territory they have taken – a “buffer zone” of as yet indeterminate size. Not only might this have value in later negotiations it could also form a base for further operations inside Russia. This meant establishing a logistics hub, with medical and repair facilities, inside Russia.
The situation is complex, in a way well described by the retired Australian Army Major General Mick Ryan:
“Both sides are now undertaking two concurrent major campaigns that are consuming large quantities or manpower (especially for the Russians), munitions and supporting arms such as EW, drones, logistics and air defence. While both might be able to surge their forces for short periods, it is unclear if the Ukrainians or Russians can sustain such an approach for months at a time. One side or the other will have to make a difficult choice about their priorities and significantly reduce their resourcing for one of their major campaigns.
The stronger Ukraine’s position in the Kursk sector the greater the effort required by Russian forces to dislodge them. Part of Ukraine’s calculation was that this would lead Russia to move some of its forces out of Ukraine to retake the lost territory. If this happened it could be one of the most important benefits of the operation. This process may have started but not yet in numbers and not yet from the main lines of the Russian offensive. Complete control of the Donetsk oblast, which has already been annexed, is a key Russian objective, so it would have been surprising if this had been abandoned. Here the campaign has been directed against the towns of Pokrovsk and Toretsk which, if taken, would threaten the Kramatorsk/Slavyansk agglomeration.
Recent fighting has been around the settlement of Niu-York which the Russians say that they have taken, although Ukraine claims it is still contested. Interestingly the Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Studies, while reporting on the continued intensity of the fighting and many small Russian gains, nonetheless claims that “Given the level of losses, the enemy is unlikely to capture Pokrovsk.” Others are less sure, and problems with shortages of all kinds and command problems are still being reported from the Ukrainian side. But it has been the case for some time that even when the Russians do take some long-sought objective they lack the combat power to exploit any breakthrough. It may be difficult for the Ukrainians to prevent Russian gains, but that may not matter so long as their defensive lines do not collapse completely. If they cannot make rapid progress the strategic dilemma for Russia will be accentuated.
The offensive is not yet over. Ukrainian forces may not be moving with the speed of the first week but they are still moving. There is now less talk of an attempt to get to the Kursk nuclear power plant (perhaps with an objective of getting Russia to hand back the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant) let alone to the city of Kursk. These would be too much of a stretch, as the forward positions would then require long supply lines. Instead Ukraine seems to be steadily expanding its areas of control. By destroying bridges over the Sejm river, it has left large numbers of Russian troops trapped without support.
Russian sources are now fretting about Ukrainian initiatives elsewhere. There was at least one probing action by Ukraine into Belgorod on 11 August, though this time without the benefit of surprise so it did not get very far. If Russian forces are taken from defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia they might become vulnerable to a resumed offensive, which in terms of Kyiv’s political objectives would make much more sense.
Meanwhile Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes have become more effective. On 9 August Ukrainian drones hit Lipetsk air base, about 140 miles northeast of Kursk, taking out its ammunition dump and a warehouse containing hundreds of glide bombs. Continuing the campaign against oil depots and refineries, an extremely damaging attack took place on a fuel depot in Proletarsk in Rostov oblast which burned for days. On early Wednesday (21 August) morning drones attacked targets in a number of Russian cities, including Moscow. Russia claimed that all 45 drones sent had been shot down: Ukraine claimed that an air defence system in the Rostov region had been taken out in a missile strike.
Unexpected setbacks such as the Kursk offensive poses problems for Vladimir Putin, who always wishes to show that he is in control of events, and for his subordinates, who must reassure him that he really is. The initial response was that the invasion was small and would soon be crushed. As an “invasion” sounded too serious it was spoken about as terrorism or a provocation or just “a situation”.
Early attempts to play it down became harder as military bloggers reported on Ukrainian gains and civilians were evacuated, with complaints from those left behind. Instead of using the threat to mobilise support for the war and add urgency to recruitment, Moscow’s tendency is still to play it down. Putin’s displeasure was evident when shown on TV discussing the situation with his senior officials. As always in a crisis he puts people he can trust in charge, whatever their competence – in this case his former bodyguard and trusted loyalist, Alexei Dyumin. As this is an interior matter the FSB has a big role, but it is the military that will have to decide about what forces can be used – and how – to push the Ukrainians out.
The Wall Street Journal reports that one of the first acts of Col. Gen. Alexander Lapin, when appointed this spring to oversee security in the Kursk oblast, was to dismantle a council, combining military officers with local and regional security officials, tasked with protecting the region. His view was that “the military alone had the strength and the resources to protect Russia’s border.” Whether keeping this council in place would have made much difference there is now no local body coordinating the response. Nato’s top general, Christopher Cavoli, is quoted as observing that:
“Russia is still pulling together its reaction to this incursion by Ukraine. There has been a fairly slow and scattered reaction to it. Part of that is because it wouldn’t exactly be clear who’s in charge.”
One report says that Russia has told its propagandists to convince Russians that the presence of Ukrainians on their territory is the “new normal”. But yet another tells of a demand by Putin that the Ukrainians be expelled by 1 October and without significant withdrawals from the forces fighting inside Ukraine. That timetable is certainly optimistic. If Ukrainian forces are able to dig in and keep the area of operations under close surveillance the task will not be simple. Former Russian general and current parliamentarian Andrey Gurulev observed on state-run television: “We must look at this situation with sobriety. We won’t be able to push them out quickly.”
There are also a couple of things that are not happening which will complicate the Russian narrative about the war. The first is that there has not been – as yet – evidence of local resistance, in contrast to the Ukrainian responses to Russia’s invasion. In addition, Ukrainian forces are behaving themselves and looking after the left-behind civilians, undermining propaganda claims of depraved neo-Nazis torturing and murdering anyone who spoke the Russian language. Second, Russia has not invoked Article 4 of the Russian-led CSTO Collective Security Treaty, according to which member states are supposed to “immediately provide” a victim of aggression with “the necessary help, including military one.”
The Washington Post reported that the Ukrainian initiative had somehow dashed hopes for a possible deal that had not previously been known to be on the cards.
A while ago Ukraine set up its own peace process. This began with a conference in Switzerland and was intended to move onto specific areas, one of which was energy security and was to be hosted by Qatar. The suggestion in the Post story was that Russia might participate with a deal that would end attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and the Russian oil industry. This would certainly suit Ukraine but no evidence was provided to suggest that this deal was close or that the Russians would have turned up even to an on-line conversation. That this was a lost opportunity has now been denied by the Russians.
Putin has only shown interest in a peace process based on Russia having the upper hand so that it can dictate terms. It is therefore not surprising that he does not see recent developments as supporting his idea of a peace process. He can no longer simply insist, for example, that any cease fire must take account of the territorial realities.
Compared with the discussion of Russia’s May mini-offensive into Kharkiv, which led to very little yet was discussed in western media as if this was another nail in Ukraine’s coffin, the inclination with Ukraine’s offensive has been to play it down. Here is a typically grudging observation from the New York Times comment pages from 12 August:
“The offensive is intended to force Russia to divert troops from a grinding fight in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, which has not happened so far, and to gain leverage for peace talks, though none are scheduled.”
Only the strategically naïve would have expected instant results from an initiative such as this. The paper continued its coverage on 19 August with the headline: “Ukraine Says Its Incursion Will Bring Peace. Putin’s Plans May Differ”. It reported “Russians who know Mr. Putin expect him to lash out in response, believing that his military has the upper hand in personnel and weaponry.” The issue, however, is not whether Putin thinks he has the upper hand but whether in practice he still does, or at least to the extent assumed.
The assumption that this is still the case explains why, despite Ukraine’s initiative, the old narrative has yet to be dislodged. This can be seen in this symposium. Ivan Eland writes, “Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces”. Mark Episkopos: “unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a large, sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defences”. Lyle Goldstein: “legitimate questions can be asked regarding the wisdom of the new offensive”. Sumantra Maitra, it might “embolden the hardliners in the Russian government, and dissuade Putin from pushing for any negotiations for peace”. Stephen Walt, “a sideshow” which “will not affect the outcome of the war.” And the inimitable John Mearsheimer, “a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate [Ukraine’s] defeat”. He added, without evidence, that:
“Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment.”
There is another view (see for example Nataliya Gumenyuk in Foreign Affairs) that the Ukrainian strategy of attrition has been working, that Russia has used up so much manpower and firepower that it lacks the reserves to respond nimbly to this latest Ukrainian challenge, that its logistics are stretched. If (and this is a big if) the Ukrainian offensive can be sustained for weeks, even months, and in particular if it obliges Russia to devote increasing efforts to expelling the intruders, then we may see a corresponding shift in Russia’s strategic calculations and the prevailing narratives surrounding the war.
Lawrence Freedman is a regular contributor to the New Statesman. This piece originally ran on his Substack “Comment is Freed“.
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