Ukraine marked the 1,000th day of its war with Russia on 19 November in the same way as the first: with a pledge to “never submit” to Vladimir Putin. Russia’s full-scale invasion, which began on 24 February 2022, shocked the US and its Western allies out of their Cold War triumphalism, igniting a major conflict on Nato’s eastern border and challenging the so-called rules-based global order. The Middle East, too, is once again convulsed by violence, precariously balanced on the threshold of all-out regional war. Confronted with this global unravelling, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has waged a valiant campaign to defend his nation’s independence, but he must now reckon with the growing demands to negotiate an end to the war with the looming return to power of Donald Trump.
From the outbreak of the conflict, President Joe Biden has led a Western alliance in Ukraine’s support. Alongside its allies, the US vowed to support Mr Zelensky “for as long as it takes”, imposing unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia, and supplying Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid. The US Congress has so far voted through nearly $175bn in support. And Mr Biden has pursued this course into the last days of his administration, earlier this month agreeing to allow Ukraine to use the US’s long-range missiles against Russian territory.
But from Mr Zelensky’s perspective, Western aid has reached Ukraine in a “maddeningly incremental” style. On the supply of everything from Britain’s Challenger 2 tanks to America’s F-16 fighter jets, the alliance has consistently refused Ukraine the weaponry it has requested, only to later buckle under diplomatic pressure.
The Biden administration has defended its approach, pointing to the risk of provoking outright war between the West and Russia – which retains the world’s largest confirmed inventory of nuclear warheads. But an international escalation has already taken place. A force of 12,000 North Korean troops recently arrived on the front lines to support Russia’s efforts to retake the parts of its Kursk province that are occupied by Ukraine.
In response, Putin has signed a revised Russian nuclear doctrine into law, ostensibly lowering the threshold for nuclear use. But the Kremlin has thus far avoided declaring that Russia is now at war with Nato – a conflict Putin had warned in September such a move would lead to. The Russian leader must balance the need to enforce his self-imposed “red lines” with the imperative to prepare for the return of president-elect Donald Trump to the White House in January. Ever since the 2016 election, Mr Trump has maintained a deferential attitude to the Russian president, referring to Putin as “smart” and “streetwise” and admiring his strategic “genius”. Their emerging relationship may now upend what remains of the current global order and determine the future of Ukraine.
During this year’s campaign, Mr Trump vowed to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours”, an improbable timeline that nonetheless bespeaks a real policy shift: forcing Ukraine to accept the loss of its occupied eastern provinces and strong-arming Mr Zelensky to the negotiating table. A Trump-enforced deal could also result in Ukraine being barred from Nato membership for at least 20 years.
Where do the UK and the Labour government figure in this equation? The Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, worked hard to establish warm relations with the Trump team before the election, and met the president-elect for a two-hour dinner in September.
In his interview with George Eaton, Mr Lammy insists that the US will not acquiesce to Russia’s demands. “What I do know about Donald Trump is that he doesn’t like losers and he doesn’t want to lose; he wants to get the right deal for the American people,” Mr Lammy said. “He knows that the right deal is peace in Europe and that means a sustainable peace – not Russia achieving its aims and coming back for more in the years ahead.”
Addressing the UN Security Council as chair, Mr Lammy warned that “Putin must fail” or “others will be inspired to wage imperialist wars of conquest” and “our faith in international law [will] never return”. Squaring the idealism of that with the decidedly transactional posture of the incoming US administration will be Labour’s challenge in the year ahead – with the fate of Ukraine in the balance.
[See also: The nationalist international]
This article appears in the 20 Nov 2024 issue of the New Statesman, Combat Zone