A Western diplomat in Russia tells me that he has never been so lonely. With relations between his government and the Kremlin even cooler than the sub-zero temperatures outside, he is adrift in unfamiliar terrain. But it’s not as though he’s short of company: everywhere he goes, he is stalked by women whose sole desire is to make passionate love with him, amenable to any acts, groupings and positions that would best serve his erotic bliss. “It’s hell,” he sighs.
What’s the catch? The women are honeytraps, agents of the Russian government sent to lure him into a compromising position so as to extract information via love or blackmail. The very term honeytrap might seem reminiscent of a different age of espionage: of Cold War turncoats, or even of Mata Hari, the exotic Dutch dancer and femme fatale who spied on the French army for the Germans during World War I. But irresistible infiltrators have been dominating the news of late. Former Conservative chief whip Simon Hart’s recently published diaries describe an MP who, having succumbed to a lady’s advances, phoned from a flat where he was trapped with 12 naked women and a CCTV camera, panicking that she may be a “KGB agent”. The courts are currently hearing the case of an agent for Russia accused of planning a sexual sting on the investigative journalist Christo Grozev. In an age of high-tech cyber espionage, why are honeytraps still happening?
In short, because personal weaknesses all too easily become national ones. Not all countries run such operations: the former British ambassador to North Korea and Belarus, John Everard, told me he is “not aware of any instance where the North Koreans have used this technique. In North Korea, there would be repugnance at the idea of a decent Korean girl sleeping with a sweaty, hairy foreigner.” But in those places that do, everyone is at risk, even if ex-diplomats stress that approaches usually come in forms other than the stereotypical random come-on. Captain John Foreman, ex-British defence attaché in Moscow, said that “every diplomat, Western or otherwise, is a potential target. This isn’t a random process. The Russian security services are always looking for human vulnerabilities. These can be unhappiness, money worries, weak physical security, a tendency of talking about sensitive matters in public, drink or drug problems, a taste for infidelity and/or a roving eye for the opposite sex. Once the FSB see a vulnerability, they will try and exploit it for intelligence advantage.”
That is not the limit of the Kremlin’s machinations. “They are sometimes successful because of human frailties and, in particular, male egotism,” Foreman said. “Working in Moscow is stressful and can be very isolating. The Russians know this and try and ramp the pressure up so diplomats lose judgement or seek solace in booze and the opposite sex.” Moscow is equally diligent at locating targets in Britain. One ex-Commons official told me he was unsurprised when an MP was suspected of being ensnared, the Kremlin having clearly done its research. “He always had a young ‘niece’ in tow. You never saw the same one twice.”
In 2009, one British deputy consul-general serving in Russia, James Hudson, quit after video footage revealed him sleeping with two sex workers. The incident raised many questions, not least why he went to a brothel when the Russians facilitate sex workers for free. But it also suggested that maybe entrapment is now less about intelligence gathering and more about embarrassing an enemy. “There is still [intelligence] value in honeytrapping,” Foreman told me. But Ian Proud, former head of chancery at the British Embassy in Moscow, said that information is not all the Kremlin wants: “Normally, if an officer gets caught, they will be sent back to the UK. That in itself is a win for Russian intelligence, as they want to minimise the number of British diplomats.”
The recruitment processes are shrouded in mystery. What makes a top-notch temptress? The handlers in Grozev’s case reflected that “you need strong, assertive and independence-driven girls”, praising one as a “true sexy bitch”. (The woman in question, Vanya Gaberova, alleged she was “lied to, manipulated and exposed”, claiming she was unaware she was being used to seduce Grozev.) Proud also advised me that “a potential honeytrapper must ensure they don’t appear obvious. Everyone in Moscow was encouraged to look in the ‘ugly mirror’ on a regular basis, to remind ourselves that, if approached by a strikingly attractive Russian, it probably wasn’t because of our looks.”
Successful operators fly under the radar by adopting a wholesome image. Russian spy Maria Butina cultivated a public passion for Disney, recording a video of her singing – somewhat unkindly – “Beauty and the Beast” with her lover, Paul Erickson, a US Republican political operative 27 years her senior. When not belting out children’s classics, though, he was giving her access to high-ranking party members. Her messages revealed the irritation at being stuck with someone she would not have chosen, griping that living with his mother was like “residing in a nursing home”.
There is also the thorny issue of love. A handler in the Grozev case complained of female agents falling for marks. And Proud told me that not only can feelings emerge from espionage, but espionage can emerge from feelings. “In many cases, a honeytrap can mean legitimate relationships that the FSB finds out about, before blackmailing the Russian citizen involved to get information. Or just plain Kompromat where an officer has been stupid enough to have an affair in Russia and gets photographed.” Most cases are “far more nuanced and heartbreaking” than Hudson’s brothel debacle, Proud added. And what constitutes a trap is often unclear, since officials without access to classified intelligence are allowed to date locals. “Two officers I know of were caught in a fairly conventional honeytrap situation in Moscow,” Proud says. “I was also aware of another case that I suspected, but because of the officer’s generally unclassified role, it was not treated as such.”
While women may make up the bulk of honeytrappers, Foreman told me that neither he nor his diplomatic contacts have heard of a woman being targeted by one. Yet, history shows women can prove more reliable sources than men, especially when afraid of losing love. Stasi spymaster Markus Wolf dispatched “Romeos” to seduce the secrets out of West German women, believing a smitten secretary was worth ten male diplomats. The Stasi even arranged mock marriages for women refusing sex outside marriage, to the point of deploying spooks disguised as priests and mothers-in-law.
Entrapments have historically required physical proximity to the target. However, the internet offers unprecedented opportunities to reach (and entice) prominent individuals. Grozev’s alleged would-be seducer sent him a Facebook friend request – which he accepted “very quickly” – before the handler boasted that he was liking her photos, “hooked and in love”. “We could definitely record something for Pornhub,” he urged.
That is before one considers the opportunities represented by catfishing. Last year, retired US army colonel David Franklin Slater was charged with providing classified information to an individual he met through a dating website who claimed to be a woman in Ukraine. She was soon sending him the sweet nothings typical of any blossoming romance, such as “American intelligence says that already 100% of Russian troops are located on the territory of Ukraine. Do you think this information can be trusted?”
The Western diplomat I spoke to in Moscow is lonelier than ever: “You just have to master yourself,” he winces. It’s established wisdom. The late Conservative minister Hugh Rossi was advised by a spook in 1970: “I’ve only one piece of advice to give you – don’t go to bed with a Russian of either sex.” Foreman told me he never left Moscow alone overnight and never drank by himself or with people he did not trust. Alternatively, General Sir Richard Shirreff, Nato’s former deputy supreme allied commander in Europe, said that, visiting Russia, he had a defence so powerful that Kremlin spies never dared approach him: “My wife came with me.”
[See also: Close encounters with Trump]
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