The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah comes as a relief and a rare bit of good news. In announcing it the US president Joe Biden expressed hope that even during his final weeks in office this might be followed by yet more good news – in particular a ceasefire in Gaza and more progress on the normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
After more than a year of violence between Israel and all the members of Iran’s “axis of resistance” – Hezbollah, as well as Hamas and the Houthis – is it possible that a virtuous cycle of conflict resolution is about to be set in motion? Might the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah be the start of a more hopeful trend?
Hamas has been left isolated, and with no reason to suppose that incoming president, Donald Trump, is going to be any more sympathetic to their cause, the group may decide to scale back its conditions for a ceasefire in Gaza, thereby making it possible to start meeting the urgent challenges of humanitarian relief while addressing the larger challenges of governance and reconstruction. Without more progress on these challenges, and recognition of Palestinian political aspirations, progress on Saudi-Israeli relations will be more of a stretch. Yet that is not the only big idea around at the moment. If the mood really turns to optimism then perhaps it might even be possible to get the US and Iran negotiating again.
This latter possibility may seem to be pushing optimism to its limits, yet it was the subject of an intriguing editorial in the Economist last week, urging Donald Trump to earn his place in history by achieving a “miraculous reconciliation“ between the two countries. By meeting Trump’s demands, the journal noted, Iran could gain the “big reward” of “normal ties”. “America’s prize,” in return, “would be the prospect of security in the Middle East, freeing it to focus on Asia.” In an interview with Politico, the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak has also mused about the possibility of a grand deal. This would certainly be the sort of surprising, high-profile, counter-intuitive move that could appeal to Trump’s vanity and sense of theatre. But is it at all possible?
Any new US administration opens up possibilities that its predecessor had closed off or could not explore if only because of an imminent election. In addition, of course, Trump is always optimistic about his own qualities and what he can achieve through what he considers to be his unique combination of toughness and deal-making. The Iranians insist that they are ready to talk, and the alternative options, including another war, are unattractive.
As I have had occasion to remark before, a good rule for when commenting on the Middle East is that you never go too far wrong by backing the pessimists. It goes with another rule: that the problem rarely lies with devising a solution which should work for all parties but in working out how to get there. And that is partly explained by yet a third rule, which is that the reason progress is difficult is that the region is so complex, with such a variety of inter-connected conflicts, that a move to sort out one conflict risks aggravating all the others. All these factors make it hard to get very far dealing with one conflict at a time. A grander project is required which accommodates all these inter-connections.
Could Trump preside over a grand project of peace-making? For all sorts of reasons the idea seems far-fetched, but in a positive spirit we can at least explore the possibility.
Trump’s first term
If the optimists are to have their day it will depend on how the new administration engages with the two countries who were pushing for a strong anti-Iran stance last time Trump was in power – Saudi Arabia and Israel – and to appreciate how the situation has changed since then.
The most disruptive action Trump took during his first term was to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal negotiated by the Obama administration with Iran in 2015. This had eased sanctions in return for Iran holding back on uranium enrichment. Critics argued that it was insufficiently restrictive on Iran’s nuclear programme yet released funds for Tehran to bankroll its hostile activities in the region, from backing Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria to boosting its proxies, including Hezbollah, militias in Iraq, and Hamas.
After abandoning the JCPOA, Trump promised that with a show of strength he could negotiate an even better deal, but this never materialised. The extra sanctions hurt Iran but yielded no concessions. Instead, as many predicted, the Iranians steadily improved their uranium enrichment to the point that they now have sufficient fissile material to construct their first few nuclear weapons should they choose to do so. Nor was Iran constrained in its regional activities. Assad was able (with Russian help) to consolidate his position in Syria while the various proxies of the axis of resistance continued to get their weapons and support.
Trump, therefore, did not, as promised, tame Iran. He did take action against the Syrian regime when it used chemical weapons and pursued what turned out to be a successful though brutal campaign, with an international coalition as well as local proxies, against the jihadist group, Islamic State. Israel was also a beneficiary of his policies as he recognised Jerusalem as its capital instead of Tel Aviv, acknowledged the annexation of the Golan Heights, and, most importantly, through his son-in-law Jared Kushner, brokered the Abraham Accords. These saw Israel establish diplomatic relations with six Muslim states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, but not Saudi Arabia.
And despite the apparent warmth of relations with the US under Trump, the Saudis became more sceptical of the US as a security guarantor. They noticed that Trump was prepared to retaliate strongly against Iran when US facilities and troops were attacked by Iranian proxies, notably in 2020 when he ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who had overseen Iran’s relations with its proxies. But when Saudi installations were attacked he was more circumspect. After an Iranian drone and missile attack on a Saudi oil processing facility in September 2019, an American response was expected but Trump baulked at the escalation and so none materialised. After this the Saudis started to hedge their bets and decided to ease their relations with Iran.
7 October and its aftermath
The Saudis insisted that they did not need to choose between the US and Iran. Talking more to Tehran, with whom there were still many points of tension, did not preclude a strong relationship with the US. Biden’s relationship with the Saudis was pricklier than Trump’s, because of human rights concerns. Nonetheless his administration also put a lot of effort into trying to get the Saudis to recognise Israel, offering a defence pact as the incentive. The final details were being sorted, including language on the Palestinian issue, when the war came.
One of Hamas’s objectives with its attack on 7 October 2023 may have been to stop the Saudis normalising relations with Israel. As likely: they sought to demonstrate to the Palestinian people that they were still fighting for their interests even if the hapless, corrupt, Fatah-run Palestinian Authority had given up. The far-right faction in the Israeli government was pressing for more territory in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Or it may just have harboured fantasies of inflicting a cataclysmic blow on the “Zionist entity”. The 7 October attack, which took many months of planning and preparation, was probably down to a combination of these motives.
What is less clear is what Hamas expected to happen. It is hard to credit, as some captured documents suggested, that the group believed Israel would fold under the shock of the attacks. Hamas must have known that there would be a ferocious response, and it is possible that it anticipated that the ferocity would lead to Israel being condemned internationally, and that this would be a major gain.
Whatever Hamas thought about the wisdom of the attack, Iran was obliged to support it. It encouraged its proxies to act in support. The most important actor was Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, on Israel’s northern border.
Instead of going all in as part of a coordinated attack, however, Hezbollah tailored its response. It fired enough missiles and rockets to prompt Israel to evacuate tens of thousands from the border area and mount some retaliatory strikes. In what turned out to be a strategic error, Hezbollah held back its main force for what Tehran still held to be its primary function, which was to threaten a much bigger assault in the event of an Israeli or US attack on Iran. It could have avoided war altogether by doing nothing or else accepted that it was bound to join in and done so by inflicting the maximum possible harm to Israel when it was at its weakest after the Hamas attack. Instead it supposed that Israel would share its interest in no more than moderate escalation. But, once Israel had completed its regular military operations in Gaza in September, it turned on Hezbollah, taking out its senior levels of leadership and command in the process.
The only really successful military operation from Iran’s axis has been the disruptive effect of Houthi strikes launched from Yemen against Western shipping passing through the Red Sea. Iran itself only belatedly entered the fight directly. It did so twice, first in April in response to the assassination of senior commanders in Damascus, and then in response to the assassination of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September. In both cases it launched volleys of missiles against Israel, each time with limited effect because of the numbers shot down (with allied help). The Israeli retaliation took out air defence systems leaving critical energy and economic hubs vulnerable to future attacks.
In the encounters on its borders since 7 October, Israel has held the upper hand militarily and has dealt heavy blows to both Hamas and Hezbollah and exposed Iranian vulnerabilities. Yet some 100 hostages remain in Gaza (of which no more than half are now thought to be still alive). While the ranks of Hamas have been severely depleted and much of its arsenal and network of tunnels destroyed, it is still capable of operating in places from where it has supposedly been driven out, and a deal with Hamas would still be required for the release of the hostages.
Meanwhile the ferocity of the operation and the human toll has led to huge criticism of Israel, even from many of its natural supporters. There is now the added complication of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant being issued for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On 20 November the US vetoed a ceasefire resolution at the UN Security Council, which all other members supported, on the grounds that although the return of the hostages was required it was not linked directly to the ceasefire. The carnage has left Gaza ungovernable, with Hamas competing for influence with armed gangs, and a distressed population requiring aid which is increasingly difficult to distribute even when it reaches the territory. Israel still lacks a credible aftermath strategy for Gaza.
First Lebanon. Then Gaza?
The situation in Lebanon has proved easier to resolve. Hezbollah has also not been completely beaten. It can still send projectiles into Israel and has fought hard in the battle against Israel Defence Forces (IDF) troops in the border areas. But it is much weakened, which undermines both its position in Lebanon and its value to Iran. The Lebanese government has been desperate for a deal and Israel wants to get its people back to northern border towns. Under the agreement, based on an old UN resolution from 2006, during the 60-day truce Israeli forces will withdraw from southern Lebanon and Hezbollah fighters would pull back to the north of the Litani river. The Lebanese Army and Unifil, the UN peacekeeping force, would strengthen their positions in the border zone. Israel would reserve the right to resume the war if Hezbollah violated its provisions. Though in principle this only lasts to the start of Trump’s second term, the presumption is that so long as it is honoured the fighting is now unlikely to resume.
The ceasefire enables Israel to achieve its core objectives of stabilising its northern border, provides some relief for the IDF, avoids further depletion of weapons stocks, and severely diminishes Hezbollah as a political and military force. Importantly, it is not conditional on a Gazan ceasefire which means it counts as an Israeli “win”, although some in Netanyahu’s base appear to view it as a defeat. The lesson here maybe is not to promise a “total victory” because then any compromise of peace will disappoint. The disappointment in this case is because a future threat from Hezbollah has not been completely removed, and there will be no reliable buffer zone, policed by the IDF, in southern Lebanon. Hard-line Israel ministers, including finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and the national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, wanted a continuing war against all Iran’s proxies until all were somehow eliminated and even the Iranian regime was toppled. In the end, the advantages to Israel were still telling. Ben-Gvir was the lone dissenting vote in the cabinet.
One reason the hard-liners could go along with this is that they have no territorial designs on Lebanon. This is not the case with Gaza, where they want to have new settlements. Netanyahu has been desperate to keep them in his coalition, because without them he may lose his majority, at which point all his legal worries, plus the demand for an investigation into the policy and intelligence failures that led to 7 October, will come rushing in.
The ceasefire leaves Hamas (which has already been complaining about a lack of solidarity elsewhere in the Arab world) on its own and Iran’s anti-Israel strategy compromised and subdued. (Iran and Hamas both appear to have approved the deal.) When the moment came, Israel survived and its proxies got hammered.
For well over a year Netanyahu has been resisting pressure from the Biden administration to show restraint in Gaza and agree to a ceasefire. Hamas played its part by also rejecting ceasefire proposals that left Israel with a presence in Gaza. If, in the aftermath of the Lebanon deal, it is prepared to compromise on the Israeli presence and release hostages to gain some relief, that would make it harder for Netanyahu to drag his feet. Recently Haaretz reported on Israeli negotiators complaining about a leak from a right-wing commentator that had compromised a possible hostage deal. This would involve the release of a small number of hostages in stages, during which a ceasefire would be announced though Israel would not be required to end the war. This is a plausible sequence and would be progress although probably not enough to move to the next stage of a plan for the governance and reconstruction of Gaza.
[See also: The war on Lebanon’s heritage]
Trump and Palestine
Netanyahu, who always plays the US political system, worked with Israel’s supporters to limit the pressure while waiting to see if Trump, who proclaimed himself to be Israel’s best friend, won the election. When he did the Israeli government was jubilant. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich were soon presenting this as permission to act with impunity, not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank, which they want to annex. They took comfort in the appointment of Mike Huckabee as the nominated ambassador to Israel, who has spoken of the West Bank as unequivocally Israeli territory. Elise Stefanik, nominated as ambassador to the UN, has also been a vocal Israeli supporter.
Yet Trump never completely ties himself into others’ agendas. During his first term he did not support settlement expansion and talked positively of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas’s interest in peace (Abbas was also quick to congratulate him on his victory). His 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace plan kept open the creation of a Palestinian state and was denounced then by settler leaders for “endangering the existence of the State of Israel”.
After meeting with Netanyahu last July, he said that he had told the Israeli leader: “You want to get it over with fast. Have victory, get your victory, and get it over with. It has to stop, the killing has to stop.”
His team is reported to have told Israeli officials that after the inauguration he does not want his administration to be spending time sorting out the dog end of a cruel and destructive campaign. Yet Netanyahu has still failed to come up with a credible plan for the aftermath. The best option, as it has always been, would be something along the lines of an international consortium, with a peacekeeping force possibly involving the Egyptians and UAE, and a prominent role for the Palestinian Authority. But even though many in the IDF and Israeli political circles accept this as preferable to the developing anarchy in Gaza, this will not be agreed by the current government. This is something else that Trump would no doubt like taken care of before he enters the Oval Office.
Trump and the Saudis
This could well be part of the new administration’s conversations with the Saudis as well as with the Israelis. Trump will expect to pick up where he left off with the Saudis, continuing with the effort to persuade them to normalise relations with Israel. But he will be dealing with a Saudi government that has shifted its positions over the past four years.
The Saudis are not going to agree to any deal with Israel, let alone help out with Gaza, while Palestinian rights are being denied and more Palestinian land is being taken in the West Bank. Netanyahu enthused in his speech to the UN General Assembly in late September about the golden future for the region if only the Saudis joined the Abraham Accords, but this was delivered after the Saudi delegation had already left the chamber in protest. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has condemned “the genocide committed by Israel against the brotherly Palestinian people, which has claimed the lives of 150,000 martyrs, wounded and missing, most of whom are women and children”.
He has launched his own international initiative to strengthen support for a Palestinian state.
In addition to this, the Saudi détente with Iran has progressed. In March 2023 China brokered a deal that led to the restoration of diplomatic relations, severed in 2016. The two countries participated in joint naval exercises. The Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has recently been touring the Gulf states with calming messages. Because of the history of Sunni-Shia tensions, taking different sides in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, support of acts of terrorism, the past assumption was that the Saudis would put their security concerns about Iran above their solidarity with the Palestinians. If Iran is now providing its own reassurances to the Saudis (ensuring for example that their ships are not struck in the Red Sea by the Houthis) then, even if the Gaza War comes to an end, the Saudis will need a lot of persuading and some major concessions on Palestine before they shake hands with the Israelis.
Trump and the Iranians
All this provides some context to the question of whether a deal can be done with Iran. Israel hopes and expects that the US under Trump will be prepared for more, not less, conflict with Iran. Netanyahu felt held back by Biden when Israel mounted its retaliatory strikes against Iran and has claimed that he and Trump see “eye to eye” on the Iranian threat. Trump’s foreign policy appointments have certainly taken hard anti-Iranian stances. In October Marco Rubio, his pick for secretary of state, insisted that the regime’s survival should be threatened to get them to “alter their criminal activities”. Michael Waltz, before being picked to be Trump’s national security adviser, urged strikes on Iranian oil exporting facilities as well as its nuclear plants.
Yet the vice-president-elect JD Vance, who is even less interested in overseas entanglements than Trump, noted before the election that US and Israeli interests would not always overlap, and that “our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran”. Trump has ruled out attempting to engineer regime change in Tehran. He told the podcaster Patrick Bet-David: “We can’t get totally involved in all that. We can’t run ourselves, let’s face it.”
Meanwhile the Iranian regime is offering renewed talks on the nuclear issue and in principle there is no reason why the Trump administration should not accept the offer, though it would probably demand much more than a reworked JCPOA. Can it go beyond that? The enmity between the two countries goes back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent seizure of American diplomatic hostages. The Islamist regime has made opposition to the US, as well as Israel, including supporting acts of terrorism, a central and incessant theme of its ideology. In return they have been heavily sanctioned by the US and its allies.
When combined with the regime’s corruption and other dysfunctions, this has led to an economy in a poor state with inflation high and growth low. This in turn has triggered outbreaks of popular discontent. The younger generation are fed up having to live under the strict disciplines imposed by the clerics. Within the country there are regular expressions of exasperation that they are stuck in a futile confrontation with the US and a government that promotes anti-Zionism with far more zealotry than Arab states.
A desire for change explains reformist Masoud Pezeshkian’s election to the presidency in July and his expressed readiness to try to agree a nuclear deal to get sanctions relief. His readiness to achieve this was evidenced in the appointments of individuals associated with past negotiations, such as the foreign minister Araghchi and his deputy, Majid Takht-Ravanchi.
In the Iranian system it is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on top, backed by the Revolutionary Guards. But Khamenei is ailing, and a struggle to succeed him is developing, in which the question of whether it is possible to maintain the ideals and militancy of the revolution while addressing the ills of the country will come to the fore.
A US-Iran rapprochement?
In making the argument that a US-Iranian rapprochement is possible, the Economist recalls Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. This is still considered to be his (and Henry Kissinger’s) signature achievement. It not only corrected an anomalous situation but also made perfect sense in the context of Sino-Soviet enmity and the need to end the US involvement in the Vietnam War. There is another example that might have been cited involving Trump, except this one was unsuccessful. This was his courtship of the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which produced some of the more astonishing images of his generally astonishing first term. Their summits promised the “denuclearisation” of the Korean peninsula. But the promise was an illusion. There was no lasting achievement. North Korea is more belligerent than ever, currently boosting Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The problem is not that a deal on the nuclear issue is impossible but that it has to be achieved while so much else is going on – ending the conflict in Gaza and sorting out the aftermath, and the possibility of a Saudi-Israeli normalisation. These will both require disabusing the Israeli government of the idea that Palestinian rights can continue to be ignored. Iran’s support for Russia in its war with Ukraine will also soon come up. And then there is the issue of oil price, where the combination of Trump’s determination to increase US production and Saudi Arabia’s frustration with Opec agreements to keep production down being ignored by Russia and others, could see the price come down, causing additional problems for Iran (and for that matter Russia). Any shift in Tehran away from current policies in order to appease Trump will be fiercely contested inside the regime.
This is a complex and full agenda, with many moving parts, for an administration that is not yet in place and for a president with a short attention span. Trump has indicated that he is not averse to a deal with Iran and one should never underestimate his yearning to be the ultimate deal-maker. At the same time one should also not overestimate his ability to succeed where so many of his predecessors have failed. The optimists can point to the positive benefits of a grand project of peace-making; the pessimists can point to the likely pitfalls along the way.
Lawrence Freedman is a regular contributor to the New Statesman. This piece originally ran on his Substack “Comment is Freed”.
[See also: Russia’s economy is doomed]
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