Ukraine’s offensive over the Russian border represents an abrupt twist in the story of a war that had largely descended into attritional stagnation. It is a risky manoeuvre. If successful, it could lead to a re-direction of Russian troops away from the front line in Ukraine. It may give the latter a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. But I struggle to see how Ukraine can recapture Russian occupied territories, just as I struggle to see how Russia can occupy more Ukrainian territories beyond a few villages.
If nothing else, the offensive, which has swept into Russia’s Kursk region, has undoubtedly been a morale booster. Ukraine has generated some positive news headlines. But this war is not going to be won by a stunt. What is unlikely to improve is the slowly but steadily progressing Ukraine-support fatigue in countries such as the US and Germany. I am not even sure that the outcome of the US elections would make much difference. Once we enter year three of the war, with the battlelines largely unchanged, a lot of people in the West will want this to end, and not only the Vladimir Putin fans of the far right. Unless one side achieves a genuine military breakthrough, the scepticism will grow.
The war in Ukraine will end when both sides realise the cost of continued fighting exceed the benefits. We are not at this point yet. Before Kursk grabbed the headlines, Russian troops had been pushed further into Ukrainian territory over the last couple of months, albeit realising only modest gains. But while a true resolution remains some way off, we can begin to speculate what it might look like. And I believe it will take a similar form to the recent prisoner exchange between Russia and the West that freed the Wall Street Journal journalist Evan Gershkovich.
That deal came out of the blue. It was the work of quiet diplomacy. The West secured the release of 15 prisoners besides Gershkovich, mostly Westerners. In return, Putin got his favourite contract killer, Vadim Krasikov, released from a life sentence in a German jail. In 2019, Krasikov killed Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a former head of a combat troop of Chechen rebels, who later helped identify Russian spies on behalf of the Georgian intelligence services. The German court that convicted Krasikov said that Krasikov acted on behalf of the Russian government. It was not entirely clear why Putin wanted Krasikov released, but the Russian president evidently wanted him badly.
The diplomacy to end the war will take longer, but it, too, will take place quietly and secretly. And it will come as a shock to Ukraine’s supporters in the West, some of whom may still believe that Ukraine can achieve total victory, including the liberation of Crimea – maybe even regime change in Russia itself. The problem for Ukraine has always been that its Western supporters do not have a commonly agreed war goal. But, in recent months, this has been overtaken by a collective sense that support for a long war is flagging.
One of the reasons behind this is economic. In fiscal terms, support for Ukraine is competing with domestic spending. Military budgets are tight everywhere. The price of gas has started to rise again on energy markets because of the critical role played by the Kursk oblast in delivering Russian gas to Europe. Ukraine has occupied the Kursk town of Sudzha, which is located close to where Russian gas enters the Ukrainian pipeline network. When the Nord Stream Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up two years ago, the Ukrainian gas continued to flow through the Sudzha transit point. Ukraine also operates large gas storage facilities on which western European heavily relies on for its own supplies. Europe is vulnerable if these gas supplies are cut off. Both sides are now openly attacking each other’s energy infrastructure.
But economic warfare doesn’t help Ukraine or the West. Western economic sanctions have so far failed to increase the pressure on Russia to quit. In fact its economy has outperformed those of the West. This is because it is protected by its geography and its broader diplomatic relations: the Eurasian continent is large, and its multiple trade routes are hard to control. China, India and Russia have deepened their strategic alliance since the war began. Russia continues to procure weapons from North Korea and Iran.
However, Russia’s resources are not infinite. Right now, Russia is benefiting from a war-economy effect, its domestic production spurred on by the imperatives of military production. That will eventually wear off. While I do not think it would be a good idea to challenge Putin to an economic endurance game, we should also not draw the opposite conclusion that Putin will want to fight forever. If there is no fundamental shift in the military situation by next year, there would really be no point for him to continue this war. The same goes for Ukraine too.
President Volodymyr Zelensky insists he will accept nothing but a total Russian withdrawal. Russia wants the four Ukrainian oblasts it unilaterally annexed in September 2022: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. International law fully supports the position of Ukraine, but this war will not be settled in the courts. From a military perspective, both sides’ stated goals appear unrealistic. My baseline scenario is that they will agree somewhere in the middle, maybe next year. There is still a lot to play for, but nobody will get everything they want. It will be a deal that will have no winners, yet one that allows both sides to claim victory. It will be a dirty deal, full of compromises, unveiled to the world as a fait accompli – much like a shadowy and unexpected prisoner exchange.
Content from our partners
Related
