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If there is one thing harder than to get the EU to accept more political integration, it is to get it to accept less. Giorgia Meloni, the Italian prime minister, has been the latest leader to try to change the EU from within. Like David Cameron before her, she, too, is failing.
The EU elections in June revealed a shift in support for the right. But the result has had no impact on how Brussels is governed. After the elections, Meloni wanted to become part of the broad coalition that runs Brussels. The other leaders chose to sideline her. They wanted to stick to the current four-party coalition – made up of the centre-right, the liberals, the Socialists and the Greens. MEPs from those four groups re-elected Ursula von der Leyen with a programme similar to last time – a touch less Green, but ultimately not fundamentally different.
To me, the biggest surprise is the continuation of the Green agenda. I thought the centre-right would have tried harder to distance itself from a bureaucratic policy that is unpopular especially among companies. The voters turned to the right, but the politics stayed left of centre.
Le Pen, too, tried to change the EU and failed. Her campaign pitch at the parliamentary elections in France was to bring energy and immigration policy back from the level of the EU and return it to the member state. Even if they won the election, that would not have been possible. The UK managed to get its multiple opt-outs from EU policies, including on immigration, because it threatened to veto a treaty change when these policies were agreed. Nobody has that leverage today. If the EU accepted Le Pen’s suggestion of a repatriation of powers, the single market and passport-free travel would be in danger of collapse. There are no majorities for more European integration, but also no majorities for less.
Meloni and Le Pen both miscalculated. The question is what conclusions they will draw. Meloni will at most get a consolation prize, a high-ranking position for an Italian European Commissioner. Le Pen gets nothing. Meloni thought that moderation would make her EU diplomacy more effective. It was an error of judgement.
I don’t think it would be rational for Meloni to continue on this path. She is not a moderate, but moderation was a tactical necessity when she took over from Mario Draghi two years ago. Italy was a large recipient of EU money from the Covid-era recovery fund. She also inherited a large deficit. Staying off the radar of bond market vigilantes was the right thing to do. But what has her moderation bought her beyond this? The bond markets are more worried about political instability in France than about Italy. Meloni will need to spend her political capital on a rise in the defence budget, and further fiscal consolidation. She is not going to win the next elections as a defender of austerity and European integration.
The European elections left the right stronger, but less united. The two political groups led by Le Pen and Meloni have now split into three. One of the issues that divides the right is Ukraine. Meloni never wavered on Italy’s support for Ukraine, unlike Le Pen and Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister. If Donald Trump were to win the US presidential elections and enforce a settlement in Ukraine, the single biggest source of disagreement among Europe’s hard right would disappear. That could be a window of opportunity for the hard right to unite, at least to form a strategic alliance. Having been shunned by the centre right during the Brussels power talks, this would be the most effective way to bring about change.
But even then, it is not about change from within. The EU’s voting system makes that impossible. A simple majority in the European Parliament after the next European elections in 2029 would still not be enough. The hard right would need to be in government in at least 15 EU countries to have the required majorities in the EU’s Council. Both Council and Parliament are needed to pass EU laws. I dare predict this is not going to happen.
What they could do, however, is to form a united front of rule breakers. Orbán has shown how this works. He uses his veto on foreign policy as a blackmail tool. If the hard right succeeds in assembling a blocking minority, it could bring the EU to a standstill. Under the EU’s qualified majority voting system, you need 55 per cent of the member states representing 65 per cent of the population to get anything done. The way to repatriate powers from the EU is to do it unilaterally, and make sure you have enough allies to block punitive measures the EU might take.
I am wondering, therefore, whether it was such a clever idea for EU leaders to have cut out Meloni. Co-opting her would have been the smarter move. It would have ensured that the split of the right is sustained. It would have allowed the centre right to distance itself more clearly from the policies of the Greens that are so unpopular among centre-right voters. And it would have made the EU less vulnerable to a divide-and-conquer strategy by Donald Trump.
They did not think this through. One of the EU’s present tragedies is that it does not have any people at the top with a capacity to think strategically. They are relationship people, who are most comfortable in each other’s company. It does not take a lot to defeat them, but you must know how the EU works. Giorgia Meloni now does.
[See also: Europe turns right]
This article appears in the 25 Jul 2024 issue of the New Statesman, Summer Special 2024